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Abstract 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is one of the dominant technology trends in recent 
years. These networks are being employed in different environments to gather data 
for various applications. Mobile wireless sensor network (MWSN) is a subclass of WSN, 
in which the nodes are mobile and frequently change their locations. 
Since sensor nodes have limited capabilities, WSNs are vulnerable to various types of 
attacks, one of which is Sybil attack. In this attack, a malicious node illegitimately 
forges several (fake) identities. These fake copies confuse and collapse the network. 
Sybil attack causes too many threats to the routing algorithm, data aggregation, fair 
resource allocation, voting system, and misbehaviour detection. Since multiple copies 
of the malicious nodes can be located in several places at the same time, Sybil can 
disrupt geographic routing protocols and collide with routing algorithms by building 
many routes from a single node. As a result, detecting and preventing this type of 
attack is crucial for the security of the wireless sensor network. 
In this thesis, I propose a new lightweight algorithm for detecting the Sybil attack in 
MWSN using observer nodes.  Observer nodes are normal, trustful nodes which have 
been initially programmed to observe the network and report malicious behaviours. 
An observer node counts the number of times a node has appeared as a common 
neighbour between itself and its neighbours. After collecting some information about 
its neighbours, each observer node considers the nodes whose counters are above a 
threshold as critical, and nodes having all critical nodes in their neighbourhood are 
considered suspicious nodes. 
The results show that true detection rate of the proposed algorithm is 98.1%, and its 
false detection rate is 0.5%, while similar algorithms could not achieve better than 
95.4% and 1.2% for these metrics, respectively. In addition, the proposed algorithm 
outperforms other algorithms in terms of overhead and scalability.  
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1 Chapter One:  Introduction 
Micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) and wireless communication technologies wit-
nessed a major breakthrough in the last few years. This has facilitated fabricating small devices 
that can run autonomously, large-scale, low powered, and inexpensive, which suits the needs 
of many industries. Such devices can be used in a kind of distributed networking called Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSNs). Wireless sensor network (WSN) is a subclass of the ad-hoc wire-
less network, which consists of hundreds to thousands of sensor nodes spread in an environ-
ment to collect data. These networks can be used in many applications, some of which have 
been shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Applications of WSN (Agrawal, 2018) 
 
Sensor nodes have limited storage, communication, and processing capabilities. A non-
chargeable battery often supplies their energy. Nodes consume energy for sending, receiving, 
and processing data. When the battery is totally consumed, the node is dead. When the num-
ber of dead nodes exceeds a certain number, the coverage of the network becomes weak, 
and the network may discontinue its normal functions.  
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Research on various aspects of WSN started from the early 1990s (Athanasios, 2011). One of 
the major concerns about these networks is their security, especially when they are used in 
critical applications, such as military missions (Akyildiz & Kasimoglu, 2004). There are many 
types of known attacks against WSN, among which Sybil attack is one of the most famous and 
serious (Levine, Shields, & Margolin, 2006). In this attack, an attacker captures a legal node 
(victim) or inserts an illegal node in the network. The captured node is called the malicious 
node, which may duplicate the identifier of existing nodes or forge multiple fake identifiers in 
different areas of the network. A model of the Sybil attack is shown in Figure 1-2. The mali-
cious node forges the following fake IDs: A, B, C, D, E, F, M, N. 
 
Figure 1-2 Sybil Attack (Zamani & Jafri, 2014) 
 
In this way, many nodes communicate with the malicious node, and, hence, it can considera-
bly affect the traffic and the routing protocols. It can also intervene in other functionalities of 
the network, such as voting, reputation evaluation, and data aggregation (Newsome., Shi, 
Song, & Perrig, 2004).  
Although the Sybil attack threatens other types of networks, such as Vehicular Ad-hoc Net-
work (VANET) (Kaur, Devgan, & Singh, 2016), according to Palak (2017), WSN is the most vul-
nerable network for this attack. On the other hand, Sybil is the most dangerous attack on 
WSN, as it affects the whole network (Palak, 2017). 
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1.1 Problem Definition  
As discussed in the previous section, Sybil is among the most serious attacks against WSN. So 
far, there have been many approaches proposed to detect the Sybil attack in non-mobile 
(static) WSN, which include radio resource testing, random key pre-distribution Newsome et 
al., (2004), received signal strength indication (RSSI) (Demirbas & Song, 2006), neighbourhood 
information (Yang, Chen, & Trappe, 2008), time difference of arrival (TDOA), and identifying 
angle of arrival (AOA) (Wen, Li, & Zheng, 2008). However, none of these algorithms can be 
applied to mobile wireless sensor networks where nodes (including Sybil nodes) are fre-
quently moving and changing their locations. 
Mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSN) consist of mobile sensor nodes which can be at-
tached to humans, animals, cars, or any other mobile devices. Detecting a Sybil attack in 
MWSN is more challenging than in static WSN. 
Research conducted on detecting the Sybil attack in MWSN using various techniques included 
clustering (Sharmila & Umamaheswari, Detection of sybil attack in mobile wireless sensor 
networks, 2012), validating nodes by the base station (Sharmila & Umamaheswari, Node ID 
based detection of Sybil attack in mobile wireless sensor network, 2012) and using watchdog 
nodes Jamshidi et al., (2017). These algorithms either suffer from low accuracy or consist of 
complicated phases and are unsuitable for MWSN with limited resources.  
In this thesis, I propose a new, lightweight, scalable algorithm to detect the Sybil nodes in 
mobile wireless sensor networks, which addresses the issues with the previous researches. 
The proposed algorithm does not rely on RSSI, AOA, radio resource testing, or random key 
pre-distribution. It uses observer nodes, which are normal, trustful nodes in the WSN which 
have been initially programmed to observe the network and report malicious behaviours. An 
observer node finds the common neighbours between itself and its neighbours. After calcu-
lating the frequency of nodes in the common lists, each observer node considers the nodes 
appearing more than a threshold as critical nodes. Then, the nodes having all critical nodes in 
their neighbourhood will be considered suspicious nodes. 
1.2 Research Motivation 
Security is an important concern regarding wireless sensor networks. One serious threat 
against such networks is Sybil attack. Existing approaches are not convenient for mobile nodes 
with limited capabilities. Therefore, the main motivation of this research is proposing a 
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practical and lightweight algorithm for detecting the Sybil nodes in MWSN which addresses 
issues with previous algorithms.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The questions that came to my mind in the initial stage of the research was as follows: 
What lightweight, scalable algorithm can be developed to detect the Sybil nodes in 
MWSNs?  
Then, I broke it to more detailed questions as follows: 
 How many observer nodes would be enough for a wireless sensor network to detect 
the Sybil attack?  
 How often should an observer node collect information about neighbouring nodes? 
 What is a suitable threshold for common neighbours to mark a node as suspicious?  
 How much overhead would the observation algorithm impose on the network?  
1.4 Research Contribution 
In this research, I propose a new algorithm for detecting the Sybil attack in mobile wireless 
sensor networks using observer nodes for monitoring the network traffic passively, as well as 
nodes’ mobility to find Sybil nodes accurately. The algorithm is intended to be lightweight by 
minimising memory, computation, and communication overheads. 
1.5 Thesis Layout 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces wireless sensor networks, 
their characteristics, and the known attacks against them. Sybil attack and existing detection 
algorithms are discussed in Chapter 3. The proposed algorithm is detailed in Chapter 4 and 
will be evaluated in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and offers several direc-
tions for the future research.  
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2 Chapter Two: Background 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is a type of ad-hoc wireless networks which consists of a group 
of sensor nodes spread into an environment to gather data for monitoring and recording the 
physical conditions. Sensor nodes have limited resources and communicate with each other 
through a wireless network. In these networks, all the data gathered by the sensor nodes are 
forwarded to a sink node. Because of resource constraints (i.e., memory, processor, commu-
nication), sensor nodes are susceptible to many types of attacks. This is while security is critical 
for many applications of WSN such as military missions and medical systems. Therefore, it is 
important to detect and prevent attacks to make WSN secure.  
In this chapter, the basic concepts that help the reader to understand the rest of the thesis 
are explained. More specifically, the chapter briefly introduces WSN, its characteristics and its 
applications. Then, existing attacks in WSN are reviewed.  
2.1 Wireless Sensor Network 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a type of ad-hoc wireless networks, which can be used in 
many applications such as military, healthcare, agriculture, environmental monitoring or sur-
veillance, and weather forecasting. Such networks may consist of hundreds to thousands of 
sensor nodes randomly scattered in an environment. Sensor nodes have limited memory, pro-
cessor, and transmission range. The energy of a node comes from a non-chargeable battery 
which, when finished, renders the node dead.   
In this section, I review the components, the architecture, and characteristics of WSN. 
2.1.1 Components of WSN 
WSN consists of the following components: 
Sensor node: A sensor node which is also known as a mote, is a device with some sensing 
capability. Sensor nodes have also limited capabilities to process data and communicate with 
each other wirelessly. A sample sensor node is shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1. A sample sensor node (Libelium, 2013) 
The structure of a sensor node is shown in Figure 2-2. As it is shown in the figure, a sensor 
node consists of three main components: sensing, computing, and communication. Since the 
cost of sensor nodes is a major concern when deploying a wireless sensor network, their ca-
pabilities (processing, memory, communication, and energy) are deliberately constrained to 
reduce their manufacturing cost.  
 
Figure 2-2. The structure of a sensor node (AboZahhad, Farrag, & Ali, 2015) 
Gateway: A gateway provides a connection between sensor nodes and the application plat-
form. Data collected by wireless nodes is aggregated and manipulated by the gateway and is 
forwarded to the application platform which may be running on a local computer, a net-
worked computer, or a mobile device.  
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Figure 2-3. Gateway node for WSN (Dener, 2016) 
Actuator: An actuator is responsible for moving and controlling the physical parts of a system. 
For example, an actuator of a monitoring system for the temperature in a room is responsible 
for controlling the air-conditioning equipment. 
2.1.2 Characteristics of WSN 
The main characteristics of WSN which differentiate it from other types of networks are as 
follows: 
 Power efficiency: Nodes are usually supplied with non-rechargeable batteries. Thus, 
efficiency in power consumption is vital for such networks.  
 Fault tolerance: Nodes are prone to failure. Thus, they must have the ability to con-
tinue network functionalities in case of node failures.  
 The mobility of nodes: Some of the sensor networks consist of mobile nodes. This 
type of sensor networks is known as mobile sensor networks (MWSN). Nodes are mo-
bile either to increase communication efficiency or due to the type of applications. 
 Heterogeneity of nodes: In a WSN, there are different types of nodes which must 
work cooperatively to provide the intended service of the network.  
 Scalability: In WSN nodes are densely deployed. So, WSN should be scalable to man-
age a large number of nodes.  
 Responsiveness: WSN must adapt quickly when the topology of the network changes.  
 Communication failures: When any node fails to exchange data with other nodes, the 
base station or gateway node must be quickly informed. 
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2.2 WSN Routing Protocols 
Routing protocols are used by sensor nodes to send data to other nodes or to the base sta-
tion. There are many routing protocols for WSN of which we briefly introduce the most pop-
ular ones in this section. These routing protocols can be classified based on several parame-
ters as follows (DEKIVADIYA, 2012): 
- Mode of functioning and applications: The routing protocols can be classified as: 
o Proactive protocols: In proactive protocols, which are also referred to as ta-
ble-driven routing protocols, each node maintains a routing table which con-
sists of routing information to all other nodes. Destination-Sequenced Dis-
tance Vector (DSDV) (Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994), Optimised Link State Routing 
(OLSR) (Clausen & Jacquet, 2003), and Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) 
(Murthy & Garcia-Luna-Aceves, 1996) are examples of proactive protocols.  
o Reactive protocols: In reactive protocols, which are also called on demand 
protocols, nodes do not keep routing tables. Instead, they search for the 
routes when they want to send data to a destination.  Ad hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) (Perkins, Belding-Royer, & Das, 2003) and Dynamic 
Source Routing (DSR) (Johnson, Hu, & Maltz, 2007) are examples of reactive 
protocols.   
Since AODV protocol has been used for this research, it is explained in more 
details here. In AODV when a node wants to send data to a destination, it 
sends the Route Request (RREQ) to its neighbours. The neighbours will for-
ward RREQ to their own neighbours until at least one node finds a route to 
the destination. Then, it sends back the Route Reply (RREP) with the infor-
mation about the route to the destination. This process is shown in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-4. AODV routing mechanism (Iqbal, et al., 2014) 
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o Hybrid protocols: Hybrid protocols are a combination of reactive and proac-
tive protocols. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) (Haas & Pearlman, 1998) is an ex-
ample of hybrid protocols. 
- Participation style of nodes: Classifications are as follows: 
o Direct communication protocols: In these protocols nodes send data to their 
destinations through the base station. SPIN (Pattani & Chauhan, 2015) is an 
example of this type of protocols.  
o Flat protocols: In flat protocols, nodes send packets to the base station 
through multiple intermediate nodes. In other words, the sender finds a route 
to the base station for sending its data. Rumor (Braginsky & Estrin, 2002) is an 
example of a flat protocol.  
o Clustering protocols: These protocols divide nodes into groups (clusters). 
Each cluster has a cluster-head (CH), which can directly communicate with the 
base station. All cluster members must send their data to the CH. Low Energy 
Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) (Heinzelman, Chandrakasan, & 
Balakrishnan, 2000) is an example of clustering algorithms.  
- Network structure: There are three classes of protocols as follows: 
o Data centric protocols: In this type of protocols, attribute-based naming is 
used to specify the property of data. These properties are used to answer 
queries for which nodes collect data from specific areas. Collected data is sent 
to the base station. SPIN is one of the data-centric protocols.   
o Hierarchical protocols: These protocols are energy efficient. Nodes with 
higher energy are responsible for routing and nodes with lower energy are 
responsible for sending data. Teen (Manjeshwar & Agrawal, 2001) is a hierar-
chical protocol.  
o Location based protocols: These protocols use the location of sensor nodes 
to find an optimal path from source to destination. The nodes location can be 
determined using GPS (Global Positioning System) signals, received radio sig-
nal strength, etc. Geographic and Energy-Aware Routing (GEAR) (Yu, Estrin, & 
Govindan, 2001) is a location-based protocol.  
2.3 Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks 
As it was discussed in the previous section, sensor nodes have limited resources and are not 
usually controlled by a central unit. Therefore, providing full security to WSN is a big challenge. 
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The main goal of the security in WSN is to provide confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and 
availability of all messages even when there exist resourceful adversaries. Since WSN is usually 
deployed in remote places and nodes are left unattended, these networks must be equipped 
with security mechanisms to defend any attack against the network.   
2.3.1 Classification of Attacks in WSN 
In Messai (2014), the attacks against WSN are classified as follows: 
 Passive attack (eavesdropping): These attacks usually monitor the packets exchange 
within the network and do not have any direct impact on the network. Since the at-
tackers do not interfere with data communication, detection of this type of attacks is 
difficult. Figure 2-5 depicts this type of attack. 
 
Figure 2-5. Passive attack in WSN Shabana et al., (2016) 
 Active attack: Attackers exchange data with some nodes and may disrupt the normal 
functionality of the network. The most well-known active attacks are as follows: 
o  Tampering: The attacker has physical access to the node to recover crypto-
graphic material such as the keys used for ciphering.  
o Black hole attack: The attacker falsifies the routing information to redirect 
the traffic towards itself. Then, the packets coming through the traffic to the 
attacker node are dropped. Figure 2-6 depicts this type of attack. 
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Figure 2-6. Black hole attack (Shabana, Fida, Khan, Jan, & Rehman, 2016) 
o Selective forwarding: The attacker plays the role of a router and refuses to 
forward certain messages and simply drops them.   
o Sybil attack: The attacker forges multiple identities in an illegitimate way. In 
this way, the attacker can intervene in some algorithms as election, routing, 
and data aggregation.  
o HELLO flood attack: Many routing protocols require the nodes to send 
"HELLO" packet to discover the route and neighbouring nodes. In HELLO flood 
attack, the attacker floods the network with HELLO messages to prevent 
other messages from being exchanged.  
o Jamming: This attack is a kind of Denial of Service (DOS) attack in which the 
attacker tries to jam the frequency of radio channels used for communication 
of nodes. This happens by sending useless information on the frequency 
bands. This jamming can be temporary, intermittent or permanent.  Fig-
ure 2-7 depicts jamming in WSN. 
 
Figure 2-7. Jamming in WSN (Shabana, Fida, Khan, Jan, & Rehman, 2016) 
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o Blackmail attack: A malicious node announces a legitimate node as malicious 
which causes the legitimate node eliminated from the network. If the attacker 
can successfully eliminate many legitimate nodes from the network, the op-
eration of the network may be disrupted.  
o Exhaustion: The attacker wastes the energy of its victim by forcing it to do 
unnecessary calculations or to sending/receiving unnecessarily data.  
o Replay attack: In this attack, an adversary may repeat or delay a message 
which was already sent to a victim. For example, assume Alice contacts Bob 
and Bob asks for her identity. Alice sends her password (which may be en-
crypted) to Bob. If the attacker sniffs the message, it may contact Bob and 
resend Alice’s encrypted password to Bob. In this case, Bob will think it is Alice 
who contacted him. This is shown in Figure 2-8. 
 
Figure 2-8. Replay attack in WSN 
 
o Wormhole attack: The attackers are spread in different parts of the network 
and tunnel messages among themselves to fool nodes to think they are neigh-
bours. In this way, attackers mislead the routing algorithm, which may result 
in excessive packet dropping.  
o Identity replication attack: The attacker clones nodes and spreads them in 
different parts of the network to mislead the routing algorithm.  Unlike the 
Sybil attack, in identity replication attack, the same identity is given to differ-
ent physical nodes.  
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2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I introduced wireless sensor networks (WSN), which are a special type of wire-
less ad-hoc networks and consist of a group of sensor nodes which collaborate with each other 
to achieve a specific goal. The applications of WSN include (but not limited to): military, 
healthcare, agriculture, environmental monitoring or surveillance, and weather forecasting. 
Nodes in some WSNs are mobile which means they change their location from time to time. 
This special type of WSN is called mobile wireless sensor network (MWSN).  
Sensor nodes have limited storage, communication and processing capabilities. Therefore, 
they are vulnerable to malicious behaviour of attackers. This is while they are usually em-
ployed in safety-critical systems for which security is vital. In response to this need, there have 
been lots of researches about preserving security in WSN. I reviewed most of the well-known 
attacks against WSN one of which is Sybil attack. In the Sybil attack, a malicious node forges 
several fake identities to convince its neighbouring nodes that there are many nodes in their 
neighbourhood. This can have harmful consequences for many algorithms such as routing, 
voting and data aggregation.  
In the next chapter, I will review some of the researches conducted for detecting and prevent-
ing Sybil attack in WSN.   
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3 Chapter Three: Sybil Attack 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed some of the well-known attacks against WSN one of which 
is Sybil attack. Sybil attack, which is one of the most popular and harmful attacks against WSN, 
was first introduced in (Douceur, 2002) for peer-to-peer networks. In this attack, a malicious 
node illegitimately forges several (fake) identities. These fake copies, which are called Sybil 
nodes, confuse and collapse the network. This attack can affect routing algorithms, data ag-
gregation, fair resource allocation, voting system, and misbehaviour detection. Since multiple 
copies of the malicious node can be located in several places at the same time, Sybil attack 
can disrupt geographic routing protocols and collide with routing algorithms by building many 
routes from a single node (Gharu, Pawar, & Agarwal, 2017). As a result, detecting and pre-
venting this type of attack is crucial for the security of the wireless sensor network.   
In this thesis, I investigate Sybil attack in more details and propose a new algorithm to detect 
this attack. Therefore, in this chapter, I pay more attention to this attack and review some of 
the researches on detecting and preventing Sybil attack in WSN. 
3.1 Types of Sybil Attack 
(Newsome., Shi, Song, & Perrig, 2004) Systematically analysed this attack for wireless sensor 
networks and classified it as follows: 
- Direct vs. indirect communication: The Sybil attack may directly communicate with 
legitimate nodes or, alternatively, it may communicate with legitimate nodes through 
malicious nodes. 
- Fabricated vs. stolen identities: Sometimes an attacker may fabricate new identities. 
For example, if the node ID is represented using a 32-bit integer, the attacker can 
simply generate a random 32-bit value. However, if there is a mechanism to identify 
legitimate nodes, the attacker cannot fabricate new IDs. Instead, it steals legitimate 
nodes IDs.  
- Simultaneity: The attacker may try all its Sybil identities in the network at once or may 
use a smaller number of them at any given time. 
3.2 Detecting Sybil Attack  
Many researchers have been conducted to detect the Sybil attack in WSN. In Shehni et al., 
(2017) a categorisation for Sybil detection algorithms has been outlined (see Figure 3-1). In 
this section, some researches which are more related to this research are explained.  
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Figure 3-1 Categorisation of Sybil attack detection algorithms in WSNs (Shehni, Faez, 
Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017) 
 
3.2.1 RSSI-Based Methods 
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) is an indication of the power level received by re-
ceiver after the antenna loss. RSSI is measured in an arbitrary unit and the higher the RSSI, the 
stronger the signal. RSSI can be used as an indication of the distance between the sender and 
the receiver.  
(Demirbas & Song, 2006) Introduced an RSSI-based locating scheme to estimate the location 
of nodes in the network using the proportion of RSSIs from multiple receivers. The nodes with 
the same location are considered as Sybil nodes. Their scheme uses four location-aware nodes 
(tracking nodes) to monitor packets sent through the network. In collaboration with each 
other, tracking nodes locate any node which sends packets. A sample scenario is shown in 
Figure 3-2 where nodes D1, D2, D3, and D4 are tracking nodes and the Sybil node forges two 
IDs: S1 and S2. Assuming the Sybil node broadcasts a message at time t1 with its first ID, S1. 
Tracking nodes record the RSSI of the message they received from S1. All tracking nodes send 
the RSSI of the message to D1. Let 𝑅𝑗
𝑘 denotes the RSSI value of the message sent by node k 
when received by node j. Then, D1 calculates and stores the ratio of RSSI it receives from other 
nodes at time t1 as follows:  
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟏
𝑹𝑫𝟐
𝑺𝟏 , 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟏
𝑹𝑫𝟑
𝑺𝟏 , 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟏
𝑹𝑫𝟒
𝑺𝟏            (3-1) 
Sybil attack detection 
Upper layer based   
(data based)  
Physical layer based (sig-
nal based) 
Identity registration 
based 
Location based 
Code attestation based 
Neighbourhood 
based 
Authentication based 
Non-location based 
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If the Sybil node broadcasts another message at time t2 with its second ID (S2), all tracking 
nodes will send their calculated RSSI to D1 again. Then, D1 calculates the ratios as follows: 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟐
𝑹𝑫𝟐
𝑺𝟐 , 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟐
𝑹𝑫𝟑
𝑺𝟐 , 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟐
𝑹𝑫𝟒
𝑺𝟐            (3-2) 
Then, D1 checks the ratios with the ones at time t1. If they are equal, it identifies S1 and S2 as 
the same node (i.e., a Sybil node). The equalities that are checked by D1 are as follows: 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟏
𝑹𝑫𝟐
𝑺𝟏 =
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟐
𝑹𝑫𝟐
𝑺𝟐 , 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟏
𝑹𝑫𝟑
𝑺𝟏 =
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟐
𝑹𝑫𝟑
𝑺𝟐 , 
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟏
𝑹𝑫𝟒
𝑺𝟏 =
𝑹𝑫𝟏
𝑺𝟐
𝑹𝑫𝟑
𝑺𝟐        (3-3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2. A sample scenario in (Demirbas & Song, 2006) 
In the paper, it is discussed that four tracking nodes are enough to detect the Sybil nodes 
because all Sybil nodes are located adjacent to each other.  
(Chen & Yang, 2010) And (Jangra & Priyanka, 2011) have also proposed an RSSI-based ap-
proach to detect the Sybil attacks. The proposed approach used LEACH protocol to cluster the 
network.  
An advanced RSSI-based technique has been proposed in (Mistra & Myneni, 2010) to detect 
the Sybil nodes while they are regulating their transfer powers.  
A Sybil detection algorithm has been proposed in (Shi, Liu, & Zhang, 2015) called LEACHRSSI-
ID (LRD) which analyses RSSI-ID tables and uses the information about the remaining energy 
and density of nodes in a cluster to find the Sybil node. 
D1 
D4 D2 
D3 
Sybil 
Node 
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3.2.2 TDOA Method 
The TDOA (Time Difference on Arrival) method is an improvement of the TOA (Time on Arrival) 
method. In TOA, it is essential to know the timestamps when messages are sent and received 
by the anchor node (beacon). Therefore, it is necessary to synchronise the time in the whole 
network. However, the TDOA method, instead of propagation time, takes into account the 
time difference of signal propagation between anchor nodes. As a result, TDOA techniques do 
not require strict time synchronisation for the WSN (Mi, hui, Yanfei, & Kefei, 2008). 
(Saxena & Sejwar, 2014) Proposed an algorithm based on TDOA localisation method for Sybil 
attack detection in cluster-based networks. The algorithm can detect the malicious behaviour 
of both cluster-head nodes and member nodes in a cluster. The algorithm considers the net-
work with the routing protocol LEACH in which nodes are clustered and cluster-heads com-
municate with cluster members. In each cluster, there is a member node which collaborates 
with three other member nodes to monitor and detect the attack when the cluster-head is a 
Sybil node. Assume the cluster-head broadcasts a message with its first ID, H1, and the four 
monitoring nodes M1, M2, M3, and M4 in the cluster receive the message in times t1, t2, t3, 
and t4, respectively. M2, M3, and M4 send the arriving time of the message to M1 and M1 
calculates the TDOA between the nodes and itself as follows: 
     𝒅𝟐,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 = 𝒕𝟐 − 𝒕𝟏, 𝒅𝟑,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 = 𝒕𝟑 − 𝒕𝟏,𝒅𝟒,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 = 𝒕𝟒 − 𝒕𝟏                    (3-4)                                                         
If the cluster-head sends another message using its second ID, H2, and the nodes receive the 
message at times t’1, t’2, t’3, and t’4, respectively, the same process is carried out to calcu-
late the new TDOA: 
     𝒅′𝟐,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 = 𝒕′𝟐 − 𝒕′𝟏, 𝒅′𝟑,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 = 𝒕′𝟑 − 𝒕′𝟏,𝒅′𝟒,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 = 𝒕′𝟒 − 𝒕′𝟏                    (3-5)                                                         
 
Then, M1 calculates the ratio of TDOA as follows: 
𝒅′𝟐,𝟏
𝑯𝟏
𝒅𝟐,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 ,
𝒅′𝟑,𝟏
𝑯𝟏
𝒅𝟑,𝟏
𝑯𝟏 ,
𝒅′𝟒,𝟏
𝑯𝟏
𝒅𝟒,𝟏
𝑯𝟏            (3-6) 
If the ratios are equal, M1 identifies the cluster-head as a Sybil node.     
3.2.3 Location-Based Methods 
These methods are based on this fact that all Sybil identities belong to the same malicious 
nodes must be in the same location. Locations are verified using specific methods such as 
triangulation (Tangpong, 2010). 
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Figure 3-3 shows the essence of triangulation to locate the malicious node. The scheme needs 
three trustful nodes to determine the location of other nodes based on the strength of the 
received signal. To find the location of each node, the three trustful nodes calculate their dis-
tances with the node. Then, by solving the following equations they find the intersection of 
the three circles, which is the location of the node. If several nodes have the same location, it 
means they are different identifiers forged by a Sybil node. 
{
  
 
  
 𝒅𝟏 = √(𝒙𝟏𝟐 − 𝒙𝟐)+(𝒚𝟏
𝟐 − 𝒚𝟐)
𝒅𝟐 = √(𝒙𝟐𝟐 − 𝒙𝟐)+(𝒚𝟐
𝟐 − 𝒚𝟐)
𝒅𝟑 = √(𝒙𝟑𝟐 − 𝒙𝟐)+(𝒚𝟑
𝟐 − 𝒚𝟐)
        
  3-7) 
 
Figure 3-3. Triangulation method (Tangpong, 2010) 
In (Sinha, Paul, & Pal, 2014) a location-based Sybil attack detection technique has been pro-
posed by describing the characteristics of Received Signal Powers (RSPs) of the nodes using 
spline curves. The spline representation of RSPs is an innovation to track the Sybil identities 
even in a mobile environment.  
3.2.4 AOA-Based Methods  
An algorithm based on the mechanism of Angle of Arrival (AOA) detection has been proposed 
in (Zhang, Fan, Zhang, & Mo, 2010) which is named Trust Evaluation Base on AOA (TEBA). TEBA 
relies on the fact that a Sybil node can create multiple identities, but has only one physical 
location. Therefore, nodes whose signal phase differences are below a threshold are consid-
ered as Sybil nodes.  
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3.2.5 Distributed Methods 
In (Li, Mittal, Caesar, & Borisov, 2012) Sybil control distributed algorithm has been proposed 
to take the control of the Sybil attack. It is an admission control mechanism for nodes in dis-
tributed systems in which nodes need to solve some computational puzzles periodically. 
In (Ssu, Wang, & Chang, 2009), a distributed algorithm has been proposed for detecting the 
Sybil nodes with no need to have extra hardware or know about the number of neighbouring 
nodes. This algorithm does not need any central mechanism such as base stations or location-
aware nodes. 
3.2.6 Using Machine Learning Algorithms for Detecting Sybil Attack  
(Zeng & Chen, 2010) Proposed a new protocol for WSN called SybilACO, which uses ant colony 
optimisation (ACO) algorithm to prevent Sybil attack. They considered the WSN as a social 
network with links between nodes as friendly relationships (see Figure 3-4). 
 
Figure 3-4. Social network model of Sybil attack (Zeng & Chen, 2010) 
The relations among trustful nodes have no problem. However, the relations among trustful 
nodes with Sybil nodes should be minimised. To minimise these relations, the proposed ap-
proach uses ACO. In this way, Sybil nodes become isolates. This is shown in Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-5. Minimising the edges between the honest region and the Sybil region (Zeng & 
Chen, 2010) 
 
(Muraleedharan, Ye, & Osadciw, 2008) Used swarm intelligence algorithm to collect infor-
mation about routes when the network is active to detect the Sybil nodes from their energy 
changes. 
3.2.7 Authentication-Based Methods 
(Butler, Ryu, Traynor, & McDaniel, 2009) Has proposed a new protocol which uses identifier-
based encryption, and nodes are prohibited from acquiring identifiers. As a result, malicious 
nodes cannot acquire multiple identities and hence, there is no chance for Sybil attack.  
(Dhamodharan & Vayanaperumal, 2015) Proposed CAM-PVM which is a message authentica-
tion algorithm. If a node is not authorised by the network or by the base station, the algorithm 
does not allow it to communicate with any other node in the network. 
In (Amuthavalli & Bhuvaneswaran, 2014) a Random Password Generation (RPG) algorithm has 
been proposed that focuses on various traffic levels and security during data transmission in 
WSN. The RPG algorithm generates the routing table, which holds information about deployed 
nodes. The intermediate nodes in the route are identified between source and destination. 
The intermediate node’s information is compared with the RPG database during communica-
tion, and then the comparison results are used to decide whether these intermediate nodes 
are Sybil or normal. 
In (Newsome., Shi, Song, & Perrig, 2004) several mechanisms were proposed for preventing 
Sybil attack which include: 
- Detecting Sybil nodes using radio source test or randomised keys. 
21 
  
- Preventing Sybil attacks using registration of identifiers, code verification, and remote 
checking of code.  
Radio source test technique requires each node to assign different signalling channels to its 
neighbours. This technique lacks efficiency because sensor nodes have many limitations. Iden-
tifier registration mechanism relies on voting and a central validation management unit in the 
network to identify Sybil nodes. 
3.2.8 Detecting Sybil Attack in Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks 
In (Banković, Fraga, Moya, & Vallejo, 2012) machine learning algorithms have been used to 
detect unknown attacks in wireless sensor networks by considering the attacks as an anomaly 
in network communication. In this work, the algorithm has been tested for Sybil attack on 
both static and mobile WSNs. The attacks have been treated as data outliers, which have been 
detected using clustering algorithms. The algorithms can achieve 100% detection rates when 
less than 52% of the nodes are malicious and can detect the presence of the attack if less than 
80% of the nodes are malicious. 
In (Sharmila & Umamaheswari, Detection of sybil attack in mobile wireless sensor networks, 
2012) a clustering algorithm has been proposed to detect a Sybil node in a mobile WSN, which 
consists of three phases: 
1. One of the nodes is considered as the base station. With the help of this node and 
after considering the packet drop rate, the nodes with minimum packet drop are cho-
sen as cluster heads. Cluster heads consider the nodes with power value lower than a 
threshold as suspicious.  
2. When neighbouring nodes send messages to the Sybil nodes collision will happen be-
cause all fake identifiers belong to the same physical node. Collisions can be used as 
an indication to detect the Sybil nodes. 
3. Routing paths are checked to see if there any intermediate node (hub) between sus-
picious nodes. If yes, the nodes are not Sybil, otherwise, they are identified as Sybil 
nodes. 
As can be seen, the algorithm consists of three complicated phases, which makes it unsuitable 
for MWSN with limited resources.  
In (Sharmila & Umamaheswari, Node ID based detection of Sybil attack in mobile wireless 
sensor network, 2012) an algorithm has been proposed to detect the Sybil nodes in mobile 
WSN which requires nodes to register themselves to the base station. The base station vali-
dates and assigns an identifier to each legitimate node. Since this algorithm relies on the base 
station, it is not scalable. 
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In (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017), an algorithm has been proposed to 
detect the Sybil attack in MWSN. The algorithm uses watchdog nodes to monitor the network 
and identify suspicious nodes. Watchdog nodes are normal nodes which are spread into the 
network and are specially programmed to collect information about the pattern of nodes 
movement. Therefore, the nodes are divided into two groups: sensor nodes (SN) and watch-
dog nodes (WN).  
The algorithm consists of two phases: monitoring and detection. In the monitoring phase, 
when one SN moves in the network and lies in the neighbourhood of one WN, the WN stores 
some information about the SN. The information is stored in a data structure called “Mov-
ing_history”, which consists of two columns—Node_ID and Bit_label—where the former 
shows the node identity, and the latter contains the binary code of each WN which has previ-
ously had this node in its neighbourhood. To minimise the size of Moving_history, the mini-
mum number of bits are considered to uniquely identify each WN. If the number of WNs is q, 
the binary code of each WN consists log2 (q) bits.  Figure 3-6 shows an example of deploying 
nodes in the network which consists of three watchdog nodes: W1, W2, and W3, 10 Sybil 
nodes: S1-S10, and several sensor nodes including a, b, c, d, x, y, z, u, and v. Figure 3-7 shows 
the Moving_history of W1 after the first round of the algorithm.  
 
Figure 3-6.  An example of node locations in WSN Jamshidi et al., (2017). 
 
  
23 
  
Node_ID Bit_label 
S1-S10 00 
x 00 
y 00 
z 00 
u 00 
v 00 
d 00 
Figure 3-7. The moving history of W1 in Figure 3-7 (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & 
Meybodi, 2017). 
The algorithm relies on this fact when a malicious node moves in the network; all associated 
Sybil identities are also moved with it. Figure 3-8 shows the location of nodes after the second 
round of the algorithm when nodes relocated in the network. At the end of each round, WNs 
communicate with each other to send the history of nodes which were previously located in 
their neighbourhood to the WN which has these nodes in its neighbourhood after the current 
round of the algorithm.  The new Moving_history of W1 and W3 are shown in Figure 3-9. As 
it can be seen in the figure, nodes x, y, and S1-10 moved to the neighbourhood of W3. Conse-
quently, their histories are also moved from W1 to W3. The binary code of W3 (10) is also 
concatenated to their previous Bit_label, which consists the binary code of W1 (00). 
 
Figure 3-8.  Location of nodes after the second round of the algorithm (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, 
Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017). 
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Node_ID Bit_label 
 
Node_ID Bit_label 
z 0000 
 
x 0010 
d 0000 
 
y 0010 
a 00 
 
S1-S10 0010 
  
 
b 10 
Figure 3-9. Left: Moving_hisotry of W1; Right: Moving_history of W3 after the second 
round (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017). 
In this way, Sybil nodes have the same Bit_label. Therefore, in the detection phase, each WN 
searches its Moving_history to find the same Bit_labels with the length greater than a thresh-
old. These nodes are considered as Sybil.  
In (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017) an algorithm has been proposed for detecting 
the Sybil attack in MWSN using watchdog nodes. In this algorithm, each watchdog uses two 
data structures, which are upper triangular matrices whose number of rows and columns 
equals to the number of nodes (see Figure 3-10). Each element (i,j) in Ak co−prs is determined as 
follows: 
- (1,1): If both nodes i and j are in the neighbourhood of the watchdog node 
- (0,0): If none of the nodes i or j is in the neighbourhood of the watchdog node 
- (1,0): If node i is the neighbour of the watchdog node but node j not. 
- (0,1): If node j is the neighbour of the watchdog node but node i not. 
After each round of the algorithm, Ak co−prs is updated and renamed as Ak+1 co−prs. 
 
Figure 3-10 Data structures used in (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017):  
a) Ak co−prs, b) Ck co−prs  
25 
  
In each round of the algorithm, the state diagram in Figure 3-11 is used to calculate each ele-
ment of Ck co−prs from Ak-1 co−prs and Ak co−prs. 
 
Figure 3-11. The state diagram for calculating elements of Ck co−prs (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, 
& Kelarestaghi, 2017) 
After several rounds of the algorithm, all watchdog nodes send their Ck co−prs to a designated 
watchdog to aggregate the elements. In the end, if the element (i,j) in Ck co−prs exceeds a thresh-
old, it means that i and j are copies of the same node (i.e., Sybil identities). In simple words, 
the algorithm counts on this fact that the pattern of movement for Sybil nodes is the same. 
So, if they are both present or absent in the neighbourhood of a watchdog node, they are 
moving together.  
The main issues of this algorithm are as follows: 
- The memory overhead is high because of storing large matrices in watchdog nodes.   
- Since a watchdog must process all Ck co−prs, it will become a single point of failure. If 
this node becomes unavailable (for example, because of running out of the battery) 
the algorithm will crash. 
- Since one watchdog node must process all Ck co−prs matrices, there are some serious 
concerns on the scalability of the algorithm. 
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3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed some of the existing researches about detecting the Sybil attack.  
As it was discussed in the previous sections, there have been many pieces of research around 
detecting and preventing Sybil attack in static WSN most of which are not suitable for mobile 
wireless sensor networks (MWSN) because most of these algorithms rely on the position of 
the nodes, RSSI, or collaboration between neighbouring nodes. (Yu, Lu, & Kuo, 2008) 
compared the complexity of some of the researches discussed in this chapter. The results are 
depicted in Table 3-1 where n is the number of nodes, d is the average number of neighbours 
for each node, and g is the number of sent messages from each node. As it can be seen from 
the table, these methods suffer from a significant overhead (both memory and 
communication) which could be a barrier to their scalability.   
Table 3-1. Comparing the complexity of several Sybil detection algorithms (Yu, Lu, & Kuo, 
2008) 
Research  Memory Communication 
Broadcast (Parno, Perrig, & Gligor, 
2005) 
O(dn) O(n2) 
Deterministic Multicast (Parno, Perrig, 
& Gligor, 2005) 
O(gn) 
𝑂(
𝑔 ln𝑔 √𝑛
𝑑
) 
 
Randomised Multicast (Parno, Perrig, 
& Gligor, 2005) 
 
O(√nn) O(n2) 
Line-Selected Multicast (Parno, Perrig, 
& Gligor, 2005) 
O(√nn) O(n√n)  
(Brooks, Govindaraju, Pirretti, 
Vijaykrishnan, & Kandemir, 2007) 
N.A. O(n log n) 
(Zhang, Khanapure, Chen, & Xiao, 
2009) 
O(√nn) O(n√n) 
(Li & Gong, 2009) O(dn) O(dn√n) 
 
In (Andalib & Jamshidi, 2016), the detection rate of some of the previous methods has been 
reported as shown in Figure 3-12 and Figure 3-13 which the former depicts true detection rate 
and the latter depicts false detection rate. (Demirbas & Song, 2006) has a very high true 
detection rate which means it can detect all Sybil nodes correctly. However, its false detection 
rate is also high which means it mistakenly considers some normal nodes as Sybil. On the other 
hand, (Dhamodharan & Vayanaperumal, 2015) and (Amuthavalli & Bhuvaneswaran, 2014) 
have very low false detection rates, but their true detection rates are also low. Therefore, 
none of these algorithms could achieve high true detection rate and low false detection rate 
at the same time. After all, these algorithms are only suitable for static WSN.  
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Figure 3-12. The true detection rate of several Sybil detection algorithms 
 
Figure 3-13. The false detection rate of several Sybil detection algorithms 
 
I also explained several algorithms for detection of Sybil attack in MWSN. A clustering algo-
rithm proposed by (Sharmila & Umamaheswari, Detection of sybil attack in mobile wireless 
sensor networks, 2012) in which collision is an indication for detecting the Sybil nodes. This 
algorithm suffers from a high complexity. 
Sharmila and Umamaheswari also proposed another algorithm for detecting the Sybil attack 
in MWSN, in which nodes must be validated by the base station (Sharmila & Umamaheswari, 
Node ID based detection of Sybil attack in mobile wireless sensor network, 2012). This algo-
rithm is centralised and is not scalable.  
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I also explained the algorithm proposed by (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) 
and (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017) for detecting mobile Sybil nodes in MWSN 
which uses watchdog nodes. Watchdog nodes are normal trustful nodes in the WSN which 
have been initially programmed to observe the network and report malicious behaviours. The 
former algorithm suffers from three problems: 
- Its convergence is very slow which means that the algorithm needs many rounds of 
execution until its detection rate becomes acceptable. 
- Observer nodes do not act independently when detecting the Sybil nodes because 
they need to send special messages to each other to detect the Sybil nodes. 
While the shortcomings of the latter are as follows: 
- High memory usage 
- Single point of failure 
- Lack of scalability 
In the next chapter, I propose a new algorithm for detecting the Sybil attack in MWSN which 
overcomes the shortcomings of the algorithms proposed by (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, Esnaashari, 
& Meybodi, 2017) and (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017).
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4 Chapter Four: Methodology 
As it was discussed in the previous chapters, Sybil is one of the most serious attacks in wireless 
sensor network (WSN). So, it is important to detect it. Many researchers have been conducted 
on detecting the Sybil attack in WSN. However, most of them rely on the location of sensor 
nodes and their signal strengths, which means these algorithms are not suitable for mobile 
wireless sensor networks (MWSN). Of course, some algorithms have been proposed for de-
tecting the Sybil attack in MWSN, but they suffer from slow convergence and scalability.  
Therefore, I decided to propose a new algorithm for detecting the Sybil nodes in mobile wire-
less which addresses the shortcomings of the existing algorithms.  The proposed algorithm 
uses observer nodes to keep the number of times a node has appeared as a common neigh-
bour between itself and its neighbours. After collecting some information about its neigh-
bours, each observer node considers the nodes which appeared more than a threshold as 
critical, and the nodes having all of them in their neighbourhood will be considered suspicious 
nodes. In this chapter, the research methodology and the proposed algorithm are detailed.  
4.1 Hypothesis 
After experimentation, I will be able to answer various questions. This is the list of hypotheses 
that will be tested throughout this research project: 
 The cooperation among observer nodes makes the proposed algorithm distributed 
and suitable for MWSN. 
 Using observer nodes results in high accuracy for detecting the Sybil nodes.  
 Memory, computation, and communication overheads of the proposed algorithm are 
low to make it suitable for WSN. 
4.2 Research Approach 
A major factor in the success of a research is choosing a suitable research approach which 
itself depends on the research problem. According to (Creswell & Creswell, 2018), there are 
three types of research approaches as follows: 
 Qualitative research: 
o  An approach for understanding the meaning individuals and groups ascribe 
to a human or social problem 
o Emerging questions 
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o Flexible written report 
o Analysis building from particular data to general themes (inductive) 
 Quantitative research: 
o  An approach for testing objective theories by examining the relationships 
among variables (deductive) 
o Numbered data which can be analysed using statistical procedures 
o Structured written report 
 Mixed methods research: 
o Collection of both qualitative and quantitative data 
o Integrating the two forms of data 
o May involve both philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks 
o Assumes a more complete understanding of a research problem than using 
one of the approaches alone 
The research method chosen for this thesis is simulation because it utilizes testing the scenar-
ios that are difficult or expensive to experiment with in the real world. It's particularly useful 
to test networking attacks and their mitigation. 
Since this research is based on simulation and the collected data is numeric, the methodology 
used for this research is quantitated which is detailed in this chapter. 
4.3 System Assumptions and Attack Model 
I divide nodes in the sensor network into two sets: ordinary sensor nodes (SN) and observer 
nodes (ON), which are randomly distributed in a two-dimensional area. SNs perform normal 
operations such as data gathering and sending data while WNs are responsible for detecting 
the Sybil attack. Each node has its own unique ID and is not necessarily aware of its location. 
All nodes are mobile and move in the network area according to a mobility model such as 
random waypoint. The nodes communicate with each other via a wireless radio channel and 
broadcast information in an Omni-directional mode.   
According to (Newsome, Shi, Song, & Perrig, 2004) there are several categories of the Sybil 
attack of which I have chosen direct, fabricated and simultaneous Sybil attack for this re-
search. The nodes in the network are divided into two groups: legitimate nodes and malicious 
nodes of which the latter cheat their neighbours by creating multiple identities (Sybil nodes). 
Any communication with a Sybil node is handled by its corresponding malicious node. Mali-
cious nodes try to trick the legitimate nodes to make them believe that they have many neigh-
bours. Since Sybil nodes do not really exist, they may affect many of the network protocols 
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and voting algorithms. I assume malicious nodes (and their associated Sybil nodes) move in 
the network similarly to legitimate nodes. 
Finally, it is assumed that the adversary tries to compromise some legitimate nodes and re-
program them to make them malicious. However, observer nodes cannot be captured and 
programmed by the adversary. 
4.4 Proposed Algorithm  
In the Sybil attack, malicious node illegitimately forges multiple (fake) identities. This means 
that the malicious node replicates itself to make many copies to confuse and collapse the 
network. For example, in Figure 4-1, the malicious node forges four different IDs. Its neigh-
bouring nodes think they have four different nodes in their vicinity.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. A malicious node which forges four IDs 
In the proposed algorithm, observer nodes are used to identify Sybil nodes in mobile wireless 
networks. Observer nodes are normal trustful nodes in the WSN which have been pro-
grammed initially to observe the network and report malicious behaviours. The proposed al-
gorithm will consist of two phases: 
- Observation: After setting up the network, all observer nodes broadcast hello mes-
sages to identify their neighbours and construct routing tables. An observer node, after iden-
tifying its neighbours, will get the list of common neighbours with each neighbour and stores 
them in its memory which is called the history. Then, the observer keeps the number of times 
a node has appeared as a common neighbour between itself and its neighbours. During the 
time, observer nodes continuously update their history.  
- Detection: After collecting some information about its neighbours and counting the 
number of times each node appears in the list of common neighbours, each observer node 
considers the nodes whose counters are above a threshold  (which is determined through 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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experimentation) as critical.  The nodes having all critical nodes in their neighbourhood will 
be considered as suspicious nodes. For example, in the network in Figure 4-2, nodes 1-6 are 
normal, node M and nodes 7-14 are Sybil nodes. Node V is the observer node.  
The algorithm identifies nodes 4, 5, and 6 as critical nodes because their counters are above 
the threshold. This means that these nodes are probably adjacent to Sybil nodes. Thus, the 
nodes having all of them into their neighbouring list become suspicious:  2, 7-14, and M. 
Note that there is a chance for normal nodes to be mistakenly considered suspicious (in the 
above example node 2 is normal but it is considered suspicious). To reduce this chance, ob-
server nodes will communicate with each other and exchange their suspicious list to identify 
the common nodes. These nodes are announced as malicious nodes.  
ID Counter Sybil Nodes: 7-14  
1 2  CNB1,v={2,4,7,9,13,14} 
2 5  CNB2,v={1,3,4,5,6,8,10,11,12} 
3 3  CNB3,v={2,5,6,7,10,13} 
4 13  CNB4,v={1,2,5,6,8,11,14,M} 
5 13  CNB5,v={2,3,4,6,10,11,13,M} 
6 12  CNB6,v={2,3,4,5,7,8,9,13,15,M} 
7 7  CNB7,v={4,5,6,8,9,11,14} 
8 7  CNB8,v={4,5,6,7,9,12,13} 
9 6  CNB9,v={4,5,6,7,8} 
10 5  CNB10,v={4,5,6,7,8,11,12,13,14} 
11 8  CNB11,v={4,5,6,10,13} 
12 3  CNB12,v={4,5,6,7,9,11,14} 
13 8  CNB13,v={4,5,6,7,8,9,14} 
14 8  CNB14,v={4,5,6,9,10,11,13} 
M 3  = 10.5 CNBM,v={4,5,6,7,10,14} 
Figure 4-2. The idea of the proposed algorithm 
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4.5 Simulation Setup 
To implement the proposed algorithm, to achieve more flexibility, instead of using existing 
simulators, I wrote a C++ program for simulating the wireless sensor network based on my 
assumptions and the model discussed in Section 4.2. Implementing the simulator with C++ 
offered higher flexibility to me than using MATLAB or other existing simulators. Before starting 
the implementation phase, I investigated several network simulators, more particularly NS2, 
OMNET++ and J-Sim. I realized they are too complicated and they lack enough support which 
might cause problems in the middle of my simulation. I read several papers and theses which 
compared the WSN simulators in terms of performance, extensibility, usability, and platforms 
(Turower, 2016), (Gupta, Ghonge, Thakare, & Jawandhiya, 2016) and (Chen, J. Branch, Zhu, & 
Szymanski, 2005). Since the extensibility was a key factor for me to implement my algorithm, 
the model of attack and measure the performance factors I needed for the evaluation, I de-
cided not to take the risk to spend lots of time learning and using one of these simulators and 
then stuck in the middle of so many problems for implementation. I implemented my simula-
tor which is inspired by some of the existing simulators more particularly SENSE 
(https://www.ita.cs.rpi.edu/) which is an open source simulator with rich documentation.  
I validated my simulator by implementing the same scenarios explained in (Jamshidi, 
Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) and (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017) 
and compared the results to ensure they match with the results reported in the two papers. 
Having the code of my own simulator I can extend my experimentation in the future, revising 
my algorithm and using different protocols and network models. 
The following parameters have been defined for network configuration: 
- Number of rounds 
- Number of nodes 
- Number of observer nodes 
- Size of the network field 
- Number of malicious and captured nodes  
- Transmission range 
- Number of Sybil nodes generated by each malicious node 
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- Threshold 
As it will be discussed in the next chapter, these parameters have been set appropriately for 
each experimentation. I also implemented node structures and their deployment in the net-
work area and their movement.  
For the physical layer, Two Ray Ground (TRG) model has been used. Instead of assuming there 
is a direct line of sight between nodes, TRG considers not only a direct path but also a ground 
reflection path (see Figure 4-3). The following formula calculates the received power at dis-
tance d (Eenennaam, 2008):   
𝑷𝒓(𝒅) =
𝑷𝒕𝑮𝒕𝑮𝒓𝒉𝒕
𝟐𝒉𝒓
𝟐
𝒅𝟒
           4-1) 
Where hr and ht are the heights of receive and transmit antennas, respectively. TRG shows a 
faster power loss than other models as the distance increases.  
 
Figure 4-3. Two Ray Ground Propagation (Eenennaam, 2008) 
 
The routing protocol for the simulation is Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
(Perkins, Belding-Royer, & Das, 2003) which is one of the reactive protocols for WSN. In this 
protocol, each node has its own routing table. When node A wants to send a message to node 
B, it checks its routing table first. If a route to B is found, the message will be sent. Otherwise, 
node A initiates a route request process and broadcasts a route request packet (RREQ). Any 
node that receives the RREQ packet searches its routing table for a route to B. If found, a route 
reply (RREP) packet is sent to A with information about the route to B. Otherwise, the RREQ 
packet is forwarded to other nodes.  
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In the simulator, malicious nodes are programmed to capture nodes and forge Sybil identities. 
The most important part of the implementation has been programming observer nodes to 
implement the proposed algorithm. These nodes are monitoring the network and communi-
cate with each other to detect suspicious nodes.  
The simulator architecture is depicted in Figure 4-4. Simulator Architecture Figure 4-4. A typ-
ical wireless sensor node is composed of several modules (e.g., timer, CPU, radio, network 
layers) each of which is based on one or more tasks. The proposed simulator defines the clas-
ses corresponding to each module, for example, routing, application, Media Access Control 
(MAC) and physical layer. These modules have been implemented as C++ classes derived from 
a core simulator layer class. Tasks have been implemented as methods within a module class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Simulator Architecture 
 
The network class encompasses several other classes as follows: 
- Energy class is used to represent the level of energy and energy consumption in a 
mobile node. 
- Battery class is used to represent the sensor nodes power supply. 
- Propagation class is used to predict the received signal power of each packet. 
Simulation Tool Architecture 
 Application Layer 
Estimated Position 
Localization Layer 
Localization Class 
Simulation Core Layer 
Routing Layer 
MAC Layer 
Physical Layer 
36 
  
- Delay class is used to compute the time a packet needs to traverse a link. 
- Malicious class that is used to implement the behaviour of malicious nodes. 
- Packet class is used to store information of the packets transmitted between different 
nodes in the network. 
- Event class is used to provide basic functionality for all events. 
- Data generator class is used to generate sensed data in the network. 
- Error class is used to handle packet losses. 
4.6 Data Collection Process 
This research involves two types of data collection processes as follows: 
- Literature review process: Similarly to other researches, the literature review is one 
major source of data for this research. Published researches have been collected from 
academic databases (e.g., IEEEXplore, ACM, etc.), books, and websites.  
- Experimental data gathering process: The second major source of data is the data re-
sult from the simulation. A network simulator is set up for implementing the proposed 
algorithm and several metrics are measured to evaluate the proposed algorithm. 
These metrics are explained in the next chapter.   
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I proposed a new algorithm for detecting the Sybil attack in mobile wireless 
sensor networks. The proposed algorithm uses observer nodes to monitor the network and 
find suspicious nodes. Observer nodes are normal nodes which are specially programmed to 
communicate with other nodes and get the list of their neighbours. The algorithm is based on 
this assumption that when a malicious node moves in the network all its associated Sybil ID’s 
also move with it. When there are many common neighbours between an observer node and 
other nodes, it means that they are adjacent to a malicious node which forges Sybil IDs.  
Therefore, the nodes which appeared in many neighbouring lists are identified as critical and 
the nodes having all these critical nodes in their neighbouring lists are considered as 
suspicious. In this way, some legitimate nodes may be considered as suspicious too. To reduce 
the chance of mistakenly considering legitimate nodes as suspicious, the observer nodes 
communicate with each other to refine the list of suspicious nodes. 
The algorithm has been simulated in C++. In the next chapter, I evaluate the proposed 
algorithm and compare it with similar algorithms.
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5 Chapter Five: Evaluation of the Proposed Al-
gorithm  
In the previous chapter, I detailed the proposed algorithm which uses observer nodes to de-
tect the Sybil attack in mobile wireless networks (MWSN). To implement the proposed algo-
rithm I provided a simulator in C++. In this chapter, I evaluate the proposed algorithm and 
compare it with similar researches. 
5.1 Data Collection Process 
To simulate the network and compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with other 
researches, I reviewed the literature and configured the network as follows: 
Table 5-1. Network configuration for simulation. 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
There are N – (M+ON) normal nodes in the network. In the beginning, nodes are distributed 
normally in the simulation area. In the table,  is considered as 0.6 x d, where d is the number 
of neighbours of observer nodes. Of course, as it will be discussed later, to evaluate several 
aspects of the proposed algorithm, I change some of the network parameters for each exper-
imentation. 
5.2  Evaluation metrics 
The proposed algorithm has been evaluated (and compared with similar researches) using the 
following metrics: 
Overhead: 
- Memory:  The amount of memory required by observer nodes to store information 
about repeating nodes in their neighbourhood. 
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- Communication: The amount of communication required by observer nodes to get 
the information about neighbouring nodes and exchanging information with other 
observer nodes.  
- Computation: Time complexity for running the algorithm by observer nodes. 
Detection Rate: 
- True detection rate: How many attackers have been correctly identified as attack-
ers? 
- False detection rate: How many normal nodes have been mistakenly identified as 
attackers? 
5.3 The Complexity of the Proposed Algorithm 
5.3.1 Memory Overhead 
Since the proposed algorithm is performed by observer nodes (ON), only ONs suffer from 
memory overhead. Each ON needs to allocate part of its memory to store common neighbours 
with its own neighbours (history). If each node has d neighbours on average, the imposed 
memory overhead is O(ONd). In addition, each ON keeps a counter for each node to measure 
the number of times the node appears in the history. If there are n nodes in the network, the 
memory used for counters is O(ONn). Therefore, in total, the memory overhead in the pro-
posed algorithm is O(ONd+ ONn). Since d << n, the memory overhead equals to O(ONn). 
5.3.2 Communication Overhead 
Energy consumption is a big concern in WSN because nodes are not rechargeable. The most 
energy consuming operation for sensor nodes is sending packets. Therefore, the number of 
transmitted packets in the network during the execution of the algorithm is one of our major 
concerns. When sensor nodes move to a new location, they broadcast “Hello” message to 
update their neighbouring table or to request a new route. Since, this is one of the require-
ments for mobile sensor networks, “Hello” messages sent by nodes are not considered as 
overhead for the proposed algorithm. At the end of each round, each ON sends (broadcasts) 
a message to its neighbours to receive their neighbours. So, the communication overhead is 
O(ON). In addition, ONs communicate with each other to exchange the list of suspicious 
nodes. This happens at the end of each round. So, the imposed communication overhead for 
exchanging suspicious nodes is also O(ON). Therefore, the communication overhead of the 
proposed algorithm in each round is O(ON). In total, after p rounds, the communication over-
head of the proposed algorithm is O(ON p). 
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5.3.3 Computation Overhead 
Since only ONs are supposed to perform the algorithm, the computation overhead is consid-
ered for ONs only. Each ON traverses the history to calculate the frequency of each node in 
the list. If each entry in the history consists k IDs on the average, to calculate the frequency of 
the nodes, the computation complexity in each round is O(ONdk). Then, the list of node 
frequencies should be traversed to identify suspicious nodes. The complexity of this is 
O(ONN). Then, ONs exchange their suspicious list and find the intersection. If we assume on 
average there are S suspicious nodes for each ON, the complexity of finding the intersection 
is O(ONS). Therefore, the total computation overhead is O(ONdk+ ONN+ ONS). Since S 
<< dk << n the computation overhead of the proposed algorithm is O(ONdk). 
Table 5-2 compares the overhead of the proposed algorithm with (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, 
Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) and (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017). 
Table 5-2. Comparing the complexity of the proposed algorithm with (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, 
Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) 
Research  Memory Communication Computation 
(Jamshidi, Zangeneh, 
Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) 
O(ONlog np) O(ONp) O(ndp) 
(Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & 
Kelarestaghi, 2017) 
O(ON n2) O(ON n2) O(n2p) 
Proposed Algorithm O(ONn) O(ONp) O(nONp) 
 
In Table 5-2, n is the number of nodes, d is the average number of neighbours for each node, 
and p is the number of rounds. As it can be seen from the table, the complexity of (Shehni, 
Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017) is higher than the other two algorithms. The proposed 
algorithm and (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) have the same communi-
cation complexity. However, since in their algorithm the moving history of the nodes is stored 
as a sequence which grows after each round, the memory overhead of Jamshidi et al., (2017) 
depends on the number of rounds and is arguably more than the proposed algorithm. Also, 
since ON < d the computation overhead of my algorithm is better than (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, 
Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017). Therefore, the proposed algorithm has lower overhead than 
the algorithm proposed in (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017). In addition, 
compared with algorithms discussed for static WSN in Chapter 3, the proposed algorithm has 
a lower overhead (see Table 3-1). 
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5.4  Detection Rates for Different Rounds of the Algorithm 
Following the configuration in Table 5-1, I evaluated the algorithm in terms of detection rate 
for which I repeated the experiments 100 times and used the average of the results. Figure 5-1 
shows the detection rate of the proposed algorithm in test rounds 50-300.  
 
Figure 5-1. Detection rate of the proposed algorithm in different rounds. 
As it can be seen from the figure, as the time passes and observer nodes communicate with 
other nodes to collect more information about their neighbours, they can detect the Sybil 
nodes more accurately.  
In addition, the false detection rate is initially high which means some of the normal nodes 
are detected as Sybil nodes. However, after several rounds, observer nodes know more about 
their neighbours and communicate with each other to exchange the list of suspicious nodes. 
As a result, the algorithm becomes more accurate in detecting suspicious nodes. 
5.5  Impact of Various Factors on Detection Rates 
To fully investigate the performance of the proposed algorithm, I conducted several experi-
ments to evaluate the impact of several parameters on the detection rate. The experiments 
are detailed in this section. 
5.5.1 Number of Sybil Identifiers Forged by Malicious Nodes 
In this experiment, I studied the impact of the number of Sybil identifiers forged by a malicious 
node (S) on both true and false detection rates. The configuration of the network is shown in 
Table 5-3. Parameter S takes the values 5, 10, 15, and 20. 
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Table 5-3. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of Sybil IDs 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 5, 10, 15, 20 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-2 shows the results for true detection rate. As it can be seen from the figure, the 
lowest detection rate is achieved for S = 5. This is because spreading fewer Sybil identifiers 
causes the number of identifiers in the Sybil group to reach below the threshold  and so the 
total Sybil group will not be detected.   
 
Figure 5-2. The true detection rate for various number of Sybil IDs 
Figure 5-3 shows the false detection rate for different values of S. As shown in the figure, 
parameter S does not have any significant impact on the false detection rate because all Sybil 
identifiers belong to a single malicious node, so different values of this parameter do not af-
fect the probability of a normal node to join a Sybil group.  
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Figure 5-3. The false detection rate for various numbers of Sybil IDs 
5.5.2 Number of Malicious Nodes 
In this experiment, we studied the effect of the number of malicious nodes (M) on the detec-
tion rate of the proposed algorithm. The configuration of the network is shown in Table 5-4. 
Parameter M takes the values 2, 5, 8, and 10. 
Table 5-4. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of malicious 
nodes 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 2, 5, 8, 10 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-4 shows the true detection rate for different values of M. As it can be seen from the 
figure, M does not have a significant impact on true detection rate in the proposed algorithm. 
That is because the proposed algorithm takes the node movement into account and each ma-
licious node moves with its own Sybil identities independently.  
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Figure 5-4. The true detection rate for various numbers of malicious nodes 
 
Figure 5-5 shows the impact of M on the false detection rate. As expected, M affects false 
detection rate. Increasing M will increase false detection rate, because the existence of so 
many malicious nodes increases the probability of a certain normal node to move with a ma-
licious node during the initial several rounds. It is noted that after 250 rounds, the false de-
tection rate becomes negligible regardless of the value of M. 
 
 
Figure 5-5. The false detection rate for various numbers of malicious nodes 
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5.5.3 Number of Observer Nodes 
In this experiment, I examined the impact of the number of observer nodes (ON) on the accu-
racy of the proposed algorithm. The configuration of the network is shown in Table 5-5. Pa-
rameter ON takes the values 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10. 
Table 5-5. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of observer 
nodes 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Obviously, using more observer nodes improves the accuracy of the algorithm. However, the 
ideal situation would be using a minimal number of observer nodes to accurately detect the 
Sybil nodes. Using many observer nodes will increase the overhead of the algorithm. As it can 
be seen from the figure, having 2 observer nodes results in a low true detection rate. However, 
using 4 observer nodes significantly improves the true detection rate. Using more than 4 ob-
server nodes does not result in significantly better detection rate. Thus, it seems that the op-
timal number of observer nodes for this network configuration is 4.  
 
Figure 5-6. The true detection rate for various number of observer nodes 
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Figure 5-7 shows the false detection rate for different values of ON. Similarly to the true de-
tection rate, the optimal value of ON is 4. 
 
 
Figure 5-7. The false detection rate for various number of observer nodes 
 
To determine the optimal number of observer nodes for the designated network, I conducted 
a couple of more experiments as detailed in the following. In the first experiment, I investi-
gated the impact of the number of observer nodes and the number of malicious nodes on the 
accuracy of the proposed algorithm. Table 5-6 shows the configuration of the network.  
Table 5-6. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of observer 
nodes and malicious nodes 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 2, 5, 8, 10 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-8 shows the impact of the number of observer nodes (ON) and the number of mali-
cious nodes (M) on the true detection rate. The number of rounds for execution of the algo-
rithm is 300. As it can be seen from the figure, when the number of malicious nodes increases, 
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true detection rate slightly decreases irrespective of the number of observer nodes. That is 
because the proposed algorithm takes the node movement into account and each malicious 
node moves with its own Sybil identities.  
As per the figure, using more observer nodes increases true detection rate. However, the im-
provement is negligible for ON  4, which means four observer nodes are enough for the net-
work configuration considered in the experimentation. This optimal number of observer 
nodes may vary from network to network.   
 
Figure 5-8. The true detection rate for various numbers of observer nodes and malicious 
nodes 
 
Figure 5-9 shows the impact of the number of observer nodes and the number of malicious 
nodes on false detection rate. The number of rounds for execution of the algorithm is 300. As 
it can be seen from the figure, when the number of malicious nodes increases, false detection 
rate also increases irrespective of the number of observer nodes. This is because the existence 
of so many malicious nodes increases the probability of a certain normal node to move with 
a malicious node during the experimentation time.  
As per the figure, using more observer nodes results in lower false detection rate. This is be-
cause more observer nodes can better cover the network area and exchange the list of suspi-
cious nodes with each other and so, the chance of considering a normal node as Sybil de-
creases. Therefore, the optimal number of observer nodes for this experiment depends on 
the highest acceptable false detection rate (from the network designer’s point of view). 
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Figure 5-9. The false detection rate for various numbers of observer nodes and malicious 
nodes 
 
In the second experiment, I studied the impact of the number of observer nodes and the num-
ber of Sybil identities forged by a malicious node (S) on the detection rate of the proposed 
algorithm. The configuration of the network is shown in Table 5-7.  
Table 5-7. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of observer 
nodes and Sybil IDs 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 5, 10, 15, 20 
Observer nodes (ON) 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-10 shows that true detection rate increases when the number of observer nodes in-
creases irrespective of the number of Sybil identifiers. For lower values of S, the true detection 
rate is lower because spreading fewer Sybil identities causes the number of identifiers in the 
Sybil group to reach below the threshold  and so the total Sybil group will not be detected. 
It seems that the amount of improvement for ON  4 is negligible. Again, the results show that 
for the designated network configuration four observer nodes are enough.  
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Figure 5-10. The true detection rate for various numbers of observer nodes and Sybil IDs 
As Figure 5-11 shows, increasing the number of observer nodes improves false detection rate 
irrespective of S. However, varying S does not have a major impact on the false detection rate. 
This is because all Sybil identifiers belong to a single physical malicious node. Thus, different 
values of S do not affect the probability of a normal node to join a Sybil group. However, as 
per the previous experiment, different values of M (number of malicious nodes) affect the 
probability of a normal node to join a Sybil group. Similarly to the true detection rate, the 
amount of improvement for ON  4 is negligible. 
 
Figure 5-11. The false detection rate for various numbers of observer nodes and Sybil IDs 
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In conclusion, it seems that for the network configuration I considered for experimentations, 
four observer nodes should be enough to achieve good performance.  
5.5.4 Threshold 
In this experiment, I examined the impact of parameter  (threshold). The values considered 
for  are 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 times the number of neighbours (d). The configuration of the network is 
as per Table 5-8. 
Table 5-8. Network configuration for investigating the impact of theta 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () (0.4, 0.6, 0.8) x d  
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-12 shows the impact of  on true detection rate. As it can be seen from the figure, 
lower values for  results in better true detection rate. This is because some of the Sybil iden-
tities may be missed by their neighbours when sending “Hello” messages. This usually hap-
pens due to collisions. As a result, the frequency of such IDs may fall below the threshold and 
cannot be detected by the algorithm. Using a lower value for  decreases the chance of miss-
ing these IDs in the algorithm.   
 
Figure 5-12. The true detection rate for different values of theta 
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Figure 5-13 shows the false detection rate for different values of. As it is evident in the figure, 
low values for  result in high false detection rate because even normal nodes with low fre-
quency will be considered suspicious. 
 
 
Figure 5-13. The false detection rate for different values of theta 
5.5.5 Transmission Range 
In this experiment, I studied the impact of transmission range on the detection rate of the 
proposed algorithm. The configuration of the network is shown in Table 5-9. Transmission 
range is from 1 to 20 meters. The number of rounds for execution of the algorithm is 300.  
Table 5-9. Network configuration for investigating the impact of transmission range 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 1-20 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-14 shows true/false detection rates for different values of transmission range. As it 
can be seen from the figure, for shorter transmission ranges, true detection is low because 
the nodes detect fewer neighbours and the frequency of occurring Sybil nodes in the common 
list is below the threshold. For transmission range over 10 m, the true detection rate is above 
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98.1%. For low transmission range the chance of finding a normal node in common list is be-
low the threshold and so the false detection rate is low. However, when the transmission 
range increases, the nodes detect more neighbours and hence, there are more normal nodes 
whose occurrence in the common list fall above the threshold and, hence, they are labelled 
as Sybil nodes.  
 
Figure 5-14. True/false detection rate for different transmission ranges 
5.5.6 Number of Nodes 
To investigate the impact of the number of nodes on the accuracy of the proposed algorithm, 
I used the following configuration for the network. The number of nodes varies in the range 
50  N   500. The number of rounds for execution of the algorithm is 300. 
Table 5-10. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of nodes 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 50-500 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-15 shows the relation between the number of nodes and the rue/false detection 
rates. As it can be seen from the figure, when the number of nodes increases, true detection 
rate also increases. This is because there are many neighbours around Sybil nodes all of which 
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have the ID of the Sybil node in their neighbouring list. So, the number of common nodes in 
the list exceeds the threshold and the Sybil node is detected.  
Also, when the number of nodes increases, the false detection rate increases because a nor-
mal node may exist in the list of neighbours of so many nodes and its frequency exceeds the 
threshold and, as a result, it is considered as a Sybil node. 
 
 
Figure 5-15. The true/false detection rate for various numbers of nodes 
I further investigated the impact of the number of nodes along with other parameters on the 
accuracy of the algorithm. In the first step, I examined the relationship between number of 
nodes and number of observer nodes as per Table 5-11. 
Table 5-11. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of nodes and 
number of observer nodes 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 50-500 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
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Figure 5-16 shows the impact of the number of nodes and the number of observer nodes on 
the true detection rate. As it can be seen from the figure, when the number of nodes in-
creases, true detection rate also increases irrespective of the number of observer nodes. This 
is because the chance of finding enough critical nodes which are common neighbours of Sybil 
and observer nodes increases. Nodes having all these critical nodes in their neighbourhood 
are identified as Sybil nodes.  
As per the figure, using more observer nodes is more useful when the number of nodes is 
small. This is because the chance of being located in the neighbourhood of Sybil nodes for 
observer nodes increases. When the network density is high it seems that four observer nodes 
are enough to achieve good performance for this network configuration.   
 
 
Figure 5-16. The true detection rate for various numbers of nodes and number of observer 
nodes 
Figure 5-17 shows the impact of the number of nodes and number of observer nodes on false 
detection rate. As it can be seen from the figure, when the number of nodes increases, false 
detection rate decreases irrespective of the number of observer nodes. This is because the 
number of critical nodes increases and so, the probability of existing a normal node in the 
neighbourhood list of all critical nodes decreases.  
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As per the figure, using more observer nodes results in better false detection rate especially 
when the network density is low. This is because observer nodes exchange the list of suspi-
cious nodes with each other and so, the chance of considering a normal nose as Sybil de-
creases.   
 
Figure 5-17. The false detection rate for various numbers of nodes and number of observer 
nodes 
In the next experiment, I studied the impact of the number of nodes and the threshold on the 
detection rate of the proposed algorithm. The configuration of the network is shown in Ta-
ble 5-12. 
Table 5-12. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of nodes and 
the threshold 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 50-500 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () (0.4, 0.6 , 0.8) x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-18 shows true detection rate for various number of nodes and different values of the 
threshold. As it can be seen from the figure, when the number of nodes increases, true detec-
tion rate also increases irrespective of the threshold. This is because, when the network den-
sity is high, enough critical nodes which are common neighbours of Sybil and observer nodes 
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can be found with a higher probability. Nodes having all these critical nodes in their neigh-
bourhood are identified as Sybil nodes.  
As per the figure, using higher values for threshold results in higher true detection rates, es-
pecially when there are fewer nodes in the network, because there will be fewer critical nodes, 
and, hence, the chance of detecting the Sybil nodes which have all critical nodes in their neigh-
bourhood list increases. However, there will also be some normal nodes having the critical 
nodes in their neighbourhood and so are mistakenly identified as Sybil.  
 
Figure 5-18. The true detection rate for various numbers of nodes and the threshold 
Figure 5-19 shows false detection rate for various number of nodes and different values of the 
threshold. As it can be seen from the figure, when the number of nodes increases, false de-
tection rate decreases irrespective of the threshold. This is because the number of critical 
nodes increases and so, the probability of existing a normal node in the neighbourhood list of 
all critical nodes decreases. 
As per this experiment, using higher values for threshold results in higher false detection rate 
especially when the number of nodes is small because the number of critical nodes decreases 
and the algorithm mistakenly considers more normal nodes as Sybil.  
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Figure 5-19. The false detection rate for various numbers of nodes and the threshold 
In the next experiment, I investigated the impact of the number of nodes and the number of 
Sybil identifiers (S) forged by a malicious node on the detection rate of the proposed algo-
rithm. The configuration of the network is shown in Table 5-13.  
Table 5-13. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of nodes and 
Sybil IDs 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 50-500 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 5, 10, 15, 20 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-20 shows that true detection rate increases when the number of nodes increases 
irrespective of the number of Sybil identifiers. For lower values of S, the true detection rate is 
lower because spreading fewer Sybil identities causes the number of identities in the Sybil 
group to reach below the threshold  and so the total Sybil group will not be detected. 
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Figure 5-20. The true detection rate for various numbers of nodes and Sybil IDs 
As Figure 5-21 shows, increasing the number of nodes improves the false detection rate irre-
spective of S. For lower values of S, the false detection rate is higher because the number of 
critical nodes becomes smaller and hence more normal nodes are considered as Sybil. 
 
Figure 5-21. The false detection rate for various numbers of nodes and Sybil IDs 
In the last experiment in this section, I examined the impact of the number of nodes and the 
number of malicious nodes (M) on the accuracy of the proposed algorithm. The configuration 
of the network is shown in  
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Table 5-14. Network configuration for investigating the impact of the number of nodes and 
malicious nodes 
 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 50-500 
Malicious nodes (M) 2, 5, 8, 10 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
As Figure 5-12 shows true detection rate increases when the number of nodes increases irre-
spective of M. Lower values of M result in slightly better true detection rate. This is because 
when there are more malicious nodes in the network, it is likely that some of them located in 
a situation that cannot be detected by observer nodes.  
 
Figure 5-22. The true detection rate for various numbers of nodes and malicious nodes 
Figure 5-23 shows how false detection rate decreases when the number of nodes increases 
irrespective of M. Increasing M will increase false detection rate because the existence of so 
many malicious nodes increases the probability of a certain normal node to move with a ma-
licious node. 
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Figure 5-23. The false detection rate for various numbers of nodes and malicious nodes 
 
5.6 Comparing Results with Similar Researches 
I compared true and false detection rates of the proposed algorithm with (Jamshidi, 
Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) and (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017). 
These two works have been chosen for comparison of the results because of their similarity 
in the attack model and the approach with my work. In this experiment, the same network 
configuration has been used for all three methods, which is detailed in Table 5-15. The number 
of rounds for execution of the algorithm is 300. I repeated the experiments 100 times and 
used the average of the results. 
Table 5-15. Network configuration for comparing the detection rated of the proposed algo-
rithm with (Jamshidi et al., 2017) and (Shehni et al., 2017) 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 300 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-24 compares the average true detection rate of the proposed algorithm with the 
other two algorithms. 
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Figure 5-24. Comparing the true detection rate of the proposed algorithm with similar re-
searches 
Figure 5-25 compares the average false detection rate of the proposed algorithm with the 
other two algorithms. 
 
  
Figure 5-25. Comparing the false detection rate of the proposed algorithm with similar re-
searches 
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As it can be seen from the above two diagrams the proposed algorithm has a higher average 
true detection rate and lower false detection rate than the other two algorithms. This is be-
cause in the proposed algorithm observer nodes communicate with other nodes to know 
about their neighbours. In this way, the algorithm gets a more holistic picture of what is hap-
pening in the network. Note that high accuracy is achieved in the proposed algorithm without 
sacrificing the efficiency (as it was already discussed the proposed algorithm has a lower over-
head than the other two algorithms).  
Although the algorithms discussed in Chapter 3 for static WSN cannot be formally compared 
with the proposed algorithm, reviewing their results (see Figure 3-12 and Figure 3-13) with 
my results reveals this fact that none of those algorithms had better true and false detection 
rates than my algorithm at the same time.  
For the last experiment, I compared the scalability of the proposed algorithm with (Jamshidi, 
Zangeneh, Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) and (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017). 
To do so, I used the following configuration for the network. The number of nodes varies in 
the range 100  N  1000. The number of rounds needed for each algorithm to converge is 
measured, i.e., the number of rounds after which the algorithm does not show a significant 
improvement in true/false detection rate. 
Table 5-16. Network configuration for comparing the scalability of the proposed algorithm 
with (Jamshidi et al., 2017) and (Shehni et al., 2017) 
Area 100x100 m2 
Nodes (N) 100 - 1000 
Malicious nodes (M) 5 
Sybil identifiers forged by each malicious node (S) 10 
Observer nodes (ON) 4 
Transmission range 10 m 
Threshold () 0.6 x d 
Mobility model Random Waypoint 
 
Figure 5-26 shows the relation between the number of nodes and the number of rounds 
needed for each algorithm to converge. As it can be seen from the figure, when there are 
more nodes in the network, the other two algorithms need more rounds for convergence. This 
is while, the number of rounds needed by the proposed algorithm to converge does not in-
crease significantly. Therefore, the proposed algorithm shows better scalability than (Jamshidi 
et al., 2017) and (Shehni et al., 2017). 
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Figure 5-26. Comparing the scalability of the proposed algorithm with similar researches 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I evaluated the proposed algorithm in terms of overhead (memory, 
communication and computation) and true/false detection rates. The analysis of the 
experimental results revealed that the proposed algorithm does not impose a significant 
overhead. Comparing with similar researches, the proposed algorithm has a lower overhead. 
I investigated the impact of several factors on the detection rate of the proposed algorithm. 
These factors included the number of nodes, the number of malicious nodes, the number of 
Sybil identities forges by each malicious nodes, the number of observer nodes, the threshold 
and the transmission range. The results are summarised as follows: 
 Number of nodes: When the number of nodes increases, both true and false detection 
rates increase. 
 Malicious nodes (M): M does not have a significant impact on true detection rate. 
However, increasing M increases false detection rate. 
 Sybil identifiers (S): A lower value of S results in a lower true detection rate. However, the 
impact of S on false detection rate is negligible.  
 Observer nodes (ON): Using more observer nodes increases true detection rate and 
decreases false detection rate. However, using more observer nodes imposes more 
overhead. The experimentation showed that for the designated network, using only four 
observer nodes are enough for the algorithm to achieve good results. 
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 Threshold ():  Lower values for  results in higher true and false detection rates. 
 Transmission range: For shorter transmission ranges, both true and false detection rates 
are low. 
Finally, I compared the detection rate of the proposed algorithm with (Jamshidi, Zangeneh, 
Esnaashari, & Meybodi, 2017) and (Shehni, Faez, Farshad, & Kelarestaghi, 2017). The results 
showed that the proposed algorithm outperforms the other two algorithms in terms of 
overhead, and true/false detection rates. 
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6  Chapter Six: Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter concludes the thesis and highlights the main contributions and findings. The first 
section summarises the thesis and the final section discusses the limitations of the study and 
provides a list of opportunities for further research. 
6.1 Summary 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of a number of sensor nodes which are spread in an 
environment to collect data for a specific application (e.g., military, medical, meteorological, 
environmental, and industrial process monitoring). Sensor nodes communicate with each 
other and with the base station through a wireless network. The main power source of a sen-
sor node is its battery which is not chargeable and when finishes the node stops all its func-
tionalities. In some WSNs nodes are mobile and may change their locations over time. This 
type of WSN is called mobile wireless sensor network (MWSN). 
To reduce the cost of employing a WSN for an application, sensor nodes are fabricated with 
limited capabilities: battery, memory, processor, and communication bandwidth. Because of 
these limitations, such networks are susceptible to many types of attacks. There are several 
known attacks against WSN: wormhole, black hole, sinkhole, blackmail, and Sybil, to name a 
few. Since Sybil attack is one of the popular and devastating attacks against WSN, this research 
was mainly focused on detecting this attack in MWSN.  
There have been many researchers conducted on detecting this attack in static WSN, which 
mostly rely on the location of nodes or their signal strengths and hence are unsuitable for 
MWSN. There are also a number of researches conducted on detection of Sybil attack in 
MWSN some of which were reviewed in this thesis. Some of these algorithms suffer from a 
significant overhead and some of them suffer from low accuracy.  
In this thesis, a new algorithm was proposed for detecting the Sybil attack in MWSN. The al-
gorithm uses observer nodes, which are normal trustful nodes and are programmed especially 
to collect some information about their neighbours and exchange this information with each 
other to identify suspicious nodes. The algorithm relies on this fact that Sybil nodes have the 
same neighbouring nodes. Thus, nodes appear in many neighbouring lists are labelled as crit-
ical and nodes having all these critical nodes in their neighbouring lists are considered as sus-
picious. The observer nodes exchange the list of their suspicious nodes to identify Sybil nodes. 
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The analysis of the algorithm showed its low complexity in terms of memory, communication, 
and computation overhead. The simulation results showed the algorithm achieved better de-
tection rates than similar researches. In addition, the impact of several factors on the 
detection rate of the proposed algorithm has been investigated which include: number of 
Sybil identities forges by each malicious nodes, number of malicious nodes, number of 
observer nodes, threshold, number of nodes, and transmission range. The following facts 
inferred from the results: 
 The number of Sybil identities forged by a malicious node does not have a significant 
impact on the false detection rate. However, creating more Sybil identities increases true 
detection rate. When malicious nodes spread fewer Sybil identities, the occurrence of 
critical nodes in the common neighbours of the observer nodes and their neighbours falls 
below the threshold and hence the Sybil nodes cannot be detected accurately.  
 The impact of the number of malicious nodes on the true detection rate is negligible. 
However, having more malicious nodes results in higher false detection rate in the initial 
rounds of the algorithm. This is because the existence of so many malicious nodes 
increases the probability of a certain normal node to move with a malicious node during 
the initial several rounds of the algorithm. This problem gets fixed after the algorithm 
progresses.   
 Using more observer nodes increases true detection rate and decreases false detection 
rate. However, using more observer nodes imposes more overhead. The experimentation 
showed that for the designated network, using only four observer nodes are enough for 
the algorithm to achieve good results. 
 Using lower values for the threshold results in higher true and false detection rates. If the 
threshold is considered too high, in the case that malicious nodes generate just few Sybil 
IDs, or their neighbouring nodes move quickly, the frequency of their neighbours in the 
common lists falls below the threshold and cannot be considered as critical. Therefore, 
the Sybil nodes cannot be accurately detected by the algorithm. 
 When the network is condensed (i.e., there are many nodes in the network) both true and 
false detection rates are high. This is because a normal node may have so many 
neighbours and its frequency exceeds the threshold and, hence, it is mistakenly 
considered as a Sybil node. 
 For shorter transmission ranges, both true and false detection rates are low. This is 
because the nodes detect fewer neighbours and hence, the frequency of occurring the 
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neighbours of Sybil nodes in the common lists falls below the threshold and the Sybil 
nodes cannot be accurately detected. 
The memory overhead of the proposed algorithm is O(ONn) where ON is the number of ob-
server nodes and n is the total number of nodes in the network. Its complexity overhead is 
O(ONp) where p is the number of rounds the algorithm executes. The computation of the 
proposed algorithm is O(nONp). Comparing with Jamshidi et al., (2017) and Shehni et al., 
(2017), the proposed algorithm imposes lower overhead. 
The average true detection rate of the proposed algorithm is 98.1% while for Jamshidi et al., 
(2017) is 91% and for Shehni et al., (2017) is 95.4%, respectively. The average false detection 
rate of the proposed algorithm is 0.5% while for Jamshidi et al., (2017) is 1.2% and for Shehni 
et al., (2017) is 4.3%, respectively. Therefore, the proposed algorithm outperforms these al-
gorithms not only in terms of overhead but also in terms of accuracy. 
Number of rounds needed for the proposed algorithm to converge has a linear relationship 
with the number of nodes with a small slope. In Jamshidi et al., (2017) and Shehni et al., (2017) 
the correlation between number of rounds and number of rounds is also a linear function but 
with a larger slope than the one in the proposed algorithm. Therefore, the proposed algorithm 
is more scalable than the other two algorithms. 
6.2 Future Work 
In the proposed algorithm, the threshold is fixed throughout the network lifetime. However, 
according to the results of experimentations, to achieve high accuracy, it must be changed 
appropriately based on other factors such as transmission range, number of nodes, number 
of Sybil IDs, number of observer nodes, and number of malicious nodes. One difficulty in this 
regard is collecting the information about the aforementioned factors dynamically, especially 
when the nodes are mobile. There are decentralised algorithms for measuring network pa-
rameters, which can be used for this purpose. Incorporating machine learning algorithms in 
the proposed algorithm for tuning the threshold parameter efficiently can significantly im-
prove the accuracy of the algorithm.  
In the experimentations, the optimum value of the observer nodes for the designated network 
was four. There is some space for theoretical analysis on this and formulating the optimum 
number of observer nodes in terms of other factors of the network.  
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One risk for the proposed algorithm is its assumption on the trustworthiness of the observer 
nodes. If they become captured by adversaries, the algorithm may fail. Thus, one avenue for 
the future research could be lifting up the security level of the observer nodes themselves. 
In the simulation, Two Ray Ground has been considered as the physical model and AODV as 
the protocol. One avenue for the future research would be investigating the impact of the 
physical model and the protocol on the performance of the proposed approach.
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